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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 1997, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. ("Hilton Davis I/,)'
which had been eagerly anticipated in the intellectual property
community. The expectations were high. It was hoped that the doctrine of
equivalents would either be abolished or clarified. A degree of consistency
would return to patent law which had been lacking with the ever expanding
application of the doctrine. Patent practitioners would once more be able to
prepare and present to their clients unambiguous and dependable
infringement opinions. Some had even argued that the Court would abolish
the doctrine altogether. Neither expectation came true. Instead, the case at
bar was Solomonically decided on the facts, and the Court offered little else
beyond a detailed analysis of earlier Supreme Court cases. The doctrine of
equivalents is here to stay, and the patent bar will now have to return to the
deeply divided Federal Circuit in the hope that the rift in the patent appeals
court can be bridged and that the Court will exhibit a higher degree of
consistency in future decisions on the doctrine of equivalents.
Part II of this article presents several concepts of patent law which are
indispensable for a proper understanding of the issues presented in this
article. Part III provides an overview of the doctrine of equivalents from a
policy perspective and from an historical perspective. Part IV discusses
various limitations on the doctrine of equivalents and several related
developments in the Federal Circuit. Part V discusses the specific Supreme
Court holdings in Hilton Davis I and attempts to reconcile this latest
decision with the earlier decision in Markman v. Westview.2 Finally, Part VI
presents a proposal for a further clarification of the application of the
doctrine of equivalents.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Patent law, like any area of law, can be understood only if the
underlying concepts are properly understood. This part provides a brief
overview of several concepts of patent law and statutory definitions pertinent
to this article. Furthermore, patent prosecution and claim interpretation are
1. 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997), rev'g 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Hilton
Davis I]. This case at the appeals court level is Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson
Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Hilton Davis 1].
2. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996), affig 52 F.3d 967
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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briefly described so as to introduce the reader to those concepts from a
practitioner's viewpoint.
A. The Patent Contract
The primary model of domestic patent theory is the so-called contract
model, which essentially states that a letters patent is a contract between the
United States and the patentee.3 The government, under constitutional
authority,4 promises the inventor to grant and enforce a monopoly in the
invention5 for a limited time. The inventor, in turn, promises to describe the
invention so that it may be made and used by those skilled in the art after the
monopoly is terminated.6 The government's side of the bargain is enforced
in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 281, which allows the patentee to bring a
civil action against a suspected infringer after the patent issues.7  The
patentee's side of the bargain comes due prior to the issuance of the
patent. The patentee is required to provide a proper and enabling description
of the invention and to disclose to the Patent Office all pertinent information
of which the patentee is aware that could influence the granting of a
3. See PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 1.02, at 1-4 (2d ed. 1997)
(citing In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958)); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 159 (1989) ("Mhe bargain held out by the federal
patent system of disclosure in exchange for exclusive use.").
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." Id.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. 11995). The monopoly is infringed by anyone who
"without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the
patent therefor[e]," 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. 11995), by anyone who induces infringement,
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (1994), and by anyone who imports into the United States a product made
abroad by a process which is patented in the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (Supp. I
1995).
6. The term of a United States utility patent is 20 years from the date of a first
application for the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994). The patent may lapse, however, if
maintenance fees are not paid every four years. Id. § 151. Design patents are valid for 14
years from the issue date, Id. § 41(b), and are not subject to maintenance fees. It is also
possible, under very restricted circumstances, to extend a utility patent term such as in the case
of drug patents, wherein the invention is subject to a lengthy review process at the Food and
Drug Administration and the patent owner may not be able to market the product at the time
the patent issues. Id. § 155. A patent owner may, however, dedicate the patented invention to
the public at any time during the life of the patent. Id. § 253 (second paragraph).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994).
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patent.8 The examination in the Patent Office is central to the determination
of patentability. The purpose of the in-depth examination is to ascertain that
the patentee is indeed entitled to each claim of the patent, that each claim is
patentable in light of the prior art, and that the public can determine from the
claims whether or not the patented invention is infringed.9
The typical application process is as follows: the inventor discloses his
invention to a patent attorney. 10 The latter prepares an application by
describing the invention in general terms, by describing at least one
preferred embodiment of the invention in detail, and by defining the
invention with one or more claims." The application is then filed in the
Patent Office together with an oath or declaration by the inventor stating that
he is indeed the first inventor of the subject matter for which the patent is
sought.12 The application is then subjected to an examination before a patent
examiner who is an expert in the technical field to which the invention
pertains.
The examiner thereby reviews the application in light of the formal
requirements under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which calls for an "enabling"
disclosure of the invention 13 and for definite and distinct claims.' 4  The
8. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997).
9. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1539 (Plager, J., dissenting) (citing Giles Rich, The Extent
of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21 INT'L REV. INDUS.
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499,501 (1990)).
10. The United States Patent Office strongly recommends that inventors employ the
services of registered patent attorneys or patent agents. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING PATENTS
(1990). When it is apparent that an application was filed by a pro se applicant, the patent
examiners are instructed to advise the applicant as follows:
While an inventor may prosecute the application, lack of skill in this field
usually acts as a liability in affording the maximum protection for the
invention disclosed. Applicant is advised to secure the services of a
registered patent attorney or agent to prosecute the application, since the
value of a patent is largely dependent upon skillful preparation and
prosecution.
MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, CH. 401, 17.01 (6th ed., rev. 2, July 1996).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
12. 37 C.F.R. § 1.63(b)(2) (1997).
13. The first paragraph of section 112 provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of
the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise,
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and
shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
[Vol. 22:783
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examiner also compares the claimed invention with the prior art, i.e., prior
patents and other technical literature, and determines whether or not, in her
opinion, the claims in the application attempt to monopolize something
which is old.15 Anything which belongs to the prior art and has entered the
public domain cannot be taken from the public and made the subject of a
patent monopoly.1
6
Upon completing the review, the patent examiner issues an Office
action, which is usually a rejection of the application. The most common
rejections in the first Office action are based on the examiner's allegations
that the claims, as presented in the application, fail to particularly point out
and distinctly claim the invention,18 that the invention defined in the claims
of the application is anticipated by the prior art,19 and that the claimed
invention is obvious over the prior art.20 The applicant then answers the
Office action by responding to each of the examiner's objections. This may
be done by either argumentatively traversing or satisfying the examiner's
requirements and, if necessary, by suitably amending the application.2'
Amendments often consist of a narrowing of the claims by adding
limiting language. Prior art rejections under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103 are
typically answered with a narrowing amendment to overcome the rejection
and .to remove the prior art. It is thereby paramount that any amendments
35 U.S.C. § 112.
14. The second paragraph of section 112 provides: "The specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention." Id.
15. Prior art is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 102 (the claimed subject matter is anticipated by
the prior art, or there exists a judicial bar against the patentability of the claimed subject
matter), and § 103 (the claimed subject matter is an obvious modification of prior art). 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1994); 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994 & Supp. 11995).
16. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 280-82 (1976). In Sakraida, the Court
discussed the labors of Hercules in the Greek fables as the prior art. Id. at 275 n.1. Sakraida
dealt with a patent claim on a water flush system for dairy farms in which dammed-up water
was quickly released and conducted through the soiled areas of the stables to wash the manure
away. Id. at 277. The claims were held to be obvious over the labors of Hercules, which
included his ingenious diversion of a nearby river through the stables and the resulting
removal of all impurities from the stables. Id. at 275 n.1.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
18. Id. § 112.
19. Id. § 102.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (Supp. 11995).
21. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994). "[I]f after receiving [an Office action with a rejection], the
applicant persists in his claim for a patent, with or without amendment, the application shall
be reexamined." Id.
1998]
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22thus made be supported in the original application. If such support cannot
be found, then the amendment is rejected as being directed to new matter
and the applicant is required, in a further Office action, to cancel the new
matter.23 When the patent examiner is satisfied that all of the statutory and
regulatory requirements have been met, the application is allowed and,
subject to the payment of an issue fee by the applicant, the Patent Office
issues a patent. 
4
B. The Patent Claim
The invention is defined in the claims of the patent72 In terms of the
above-noted contract model, the claims define the boundaries of the
government's side of the bargain, and the monopoly granted to the patentee
covers everything which falls squarely within the boundaries of the
26
claims. A patent claim, which may be in independent or dependent form,
consists of an introductory phrase (the preamble), a transitional phrase, and a
claim body. Generally, the preamble introduces the reader to the field to
which the invention belongs, and the body defines the combination of
elements or process steps which make up the invention. Alternatively, the
preamble may recite the elements of a prior art product or process, and the
body of the claim may recite an improvement over that prior art.27 The
transition between the preamble and the body of the claim may be open-
ended or closed. An open-ended term such as "comprising" or "the
22. Id. "No amendment shall introduce new matter into the disclosure of the
invention." Id. It is possible, however, to force the entry of such new matter by filing a
continuing application. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.53, -. 60, -. 62(a) (1997). A continuing application
which adds subject matter relative to the first application, the parent application, is referred to
as a continuation-in-part ("CIP"). 37 C.F.R. § 1.53. The applicant is thereby afforded the
date of the parent application for any disclosure contained therein, and the date of the CIP for
the subject matter added in the continuing application. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1994).
23. Id. § 132.
24. Id. § 151. When an applicant appears to be entitled to a patent under law, the
Patent Office will issue a notice of allowance and upon the payment of an issue fee within
three months of the notice of allowance, a letters patent is issued to the applicant in the name
of the United States. Id. §§ 151,153.
25. Id. § 112 (second paragraph).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (third paragraph). An independent claim defines a complete
invention by itself. A dependent claim refers back to an independent claim (directly or
indirectly) and incorporates any and all of the subject matter of that independent claim. Id.
(fourth paragraph).
27. Improvement-type claims are also referred to as "Jepson claims." See ROBERT C.
FABER, LANDIs ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIm DRAFMNG § 57 (4th ed. 1996) (citing In re
Jepson, 1917 C.D. 62, 243 O.G. 525 (Ass't Comm'r Patents 1917)).
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invention comprises" means that the invention requires at least all of the
elements recited in the body, and maybe more.2 For infringement purposes,
if the accused product or process has all of the elements of such an open-
ended claim, and several additional elements, the claim is still infringed. 29 It
is only necessary for the patentee to show that the accused product or
process incorporates all of the claimed elements. 30 If, on the other hand, the
claim is written with a closed transition, such as "consisting of' or "the
invention consists of," then only exact accord between the accused product
or process and the claim body, will support a holding of patent
infringement.
3
'
It is difficult to overstate the importance of a patent claim in modem
United States patent practice. The scope of the claims alone answers the
question whether or not a product or process infringes a patent.32 To be sure,
during the early stages of United States patent law, the patent claim was
relatively unimportant and it generally consisted of a catchall phrase which
covered "the invention as described. 33 The central claiming system for
utility patents was replaced in 1836 with the peripheral claiming system,
where the statute required that a patentee "particularly specify and point out
the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his own
invention."34 A peripheral claim thus stakes out the boundaries within which
the patentee holds his monopoly. The general description of the invention
which makes up the bulk of the patent is thus considerably less important in
the context of patent infringement. In the peripheral claiming system it is
therefore possible for a product to be virtually identical to an invention
described in a patent, yet the claimed invention is not infringed.
This proposition is best explained by way of a simple example. Assume
the invention is a four-legged stool with an upholstered seat and it is defined
in the following claim: "A stool, comprising: a plate having a seating
surface, upholstery covering said seating surface, and four legs each screwed
to said plate opposite said upholstery and supporting said seating surface in a
28. Id.§§7,8.
29. Id.
30. Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that
"each element of a claim is material and essential," and the burden is on the plaintiff to show
that every element of the claim or a substantial equivalent is present in the accused product or
process).
31. FABER, supra note 27 at §§ 7, 8.
32. See Lemelson, 752 F.2d at 1538.
33. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1565 (Nies, J., dissenting). See generally 3 DONALD
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 8 (Supp.) to § 8.02 (1997).
34. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1539 (Plager, J., dissenting) (citing Keystone Bridge Co.
v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274, 278 (1877)).
1998]
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substantially horizontal position." The claim thus defines the invention as a
combination of three elements, the plate, the upholstery, and the legs. In
order to show infringement, the patentee must show that the accused device
has all three elements in the same combination. 35 Any stool or chair with an
upholstered seating surface and with four legs screwed to the seating plate
could be shown to infringe the claim. Also, a stool with an upholstered
seating surface, five or six legs, a backrest, and two arm rests would still
literally infringe the claim because each of the three elements of the claim is
found in the accused product.36 However, a stool with an upholstered
seating surface and only three legs would not literally infringe the claim. It
could also be argued that, because of the use of the term, "screwed," the
claim inferentially included a fourth element, namely screws or bolts with
which the legs are attached to the seating plate. Accordingly, a stool with
four legs "glued" or "stapled" to the seating surface plate would not literally
infringe the claim. The fact that the stool described in the patent
specification (even with an express teaching that any number of legs over
three would be acceptable or a statement that the legs may be glued or
stapled to the seating surface plate) and the accused stool may be virtually
identical is of little importance. Only the claim defines the invention.
Whether or not infringement could possibly be shown in the foregoing
example under the doctrine of equivalents will be discussed later in this
article. An essential point to remember in this context, however, is that if a
claim is literally infringed, the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel play no role in the infringement analysis.
37
An element in a claim may also be expressed as a means for performing
a certain function. 38 Such means-plus-function recitations cover everything
expressly described in the specification and their equivalents. 39 By way of
example, the stool legs in the above claim could be recited as "means for
supporting said seating surface in a substantially horizontal position," or the
like. The claim could thus be read on a swing, on a cherry picker seat, or on
a camera boom support. Proper claim construction would now turn on the
questions of whether or not these alternative embodiments were described in
the specification and whether or not they are equivalents of the described
35. Id.
36. If, on the other hand, the claim were in the closed format and the term "comprising"
were replaced with "consisting of," then a stool with a fourth element such as the backrest
would not read on the claim and the patented invention would not be infringed.
37. See, e.g., Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 755 F.2d 1549, 1558-59 (Fed.
Cir. 1985).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (sixth paragraph).
39. Id.
[Vol. 22:783
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stool legs.a° The Patent Office during the patent prosecution phase and the
courts in an infringement action, determine the scope of a means-plus-
function limitation from the specific structure described in the specification
and equivalents thereof.41
C. The Enabling Disclosure
The inventor's side of the bargain requires that he contribute to the arts
a disclosure which, when read by a person of skill in the pertinent art,
enables the skilled artisan to make and use the invention.42 The invention
must be described in "full, clear, concise, and exact terms." '43 Finally, the
inventor must present a best mode example, i.e., an exemplary embodiment
of the invention which the inventor, at the time the application is first filed at
the Patent Office, deems to be the best mode of the invention. 44 No proof is
necessary as to how the invention was conceived.
45
It is important to note that the description of the invention must fully
support and enable the claimed invention. If a patent specification fails to
properly teach and enable the invention, then the contract between the
patentee and the government is void for lack of consideration.46 Similarly, if
the description does not support the entire scope of the claimed invention-
the claim is too broad in view of the disclosure-then the contract may be
void for insufficiency of consideration. 47
Once more, this proposition may be best underscored with a simple, yet
timely example: Assume the invention is for a disinfectant composition with
two main components, namely a benzalkonium and a phospholipid. The
specification describes and provides examples of various mixtures of 1) a
benzalkonium halide in a range from 3% to 5% by weight; and 2) a synthetic
phospholipid in a range from 1% to 10% by weight. The broadest claim, on
the other hand, defines the benzalkonium component in a range of up to a
40. See, e.g., In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en bane)
(holding that, similar to the courts in infringement actions, the Patent Office must consider
limitations on means-plus-function elements as dictated by the specification, and not import
into the element the broadest possible meaning which reads on anything under the sun).
41. Id. at 1195.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (first paragraph).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 1 1995). 'Patentability shall not be negatived by the
manner in which the invention was made." Id. § 103(a).
46. In re Tenney, 254 F.2d 619, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1958); see ROSENBERo, supra note 3, at
§ 1.02.
47. See Tenney, 254 F.2d at 624.
1998]
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maximum of 5% without providing a lower limit. Such a claim may be
argued to be too broad in light of the disclosure and a patent examiner would
typically require that the applicant provide a lower limit. Bound by the
prohibition against the addition of new matter,48 the applicant could only
amend the claim to recite a maximum range from 3% to 5%. If such a
narrow range is not acceptable, then the inventor must choose between the
two alternatives of accepting the severely limited claim, or of filing a
continuation-in-part application "CIP.,,49 The latter alternative, however, is
often avoided because of the added cost50 and considerable delay in
prosecution.51
D. After the Grant-Reissue
Once a patent has been issued by the Patent Office, it becomes a public
document which defines the patentee's rights within the boundaries of the
claims. The patentee has a right to exclude anyone from making, using,
selling, or importing the claimed invention.52 If the patent is found to be
defective, it may be surrendered and the Patent Office may reissue a
corrected version of the patent.53 The patent is defective if it contains
mistakes in the description, in the drawing, or in the claims.54 The claims
are considered defective when they are too broad, i.e., the patentee claimed
more than he had a right to claim.5 They are also considered defective when
they are too narrow, i.e., the patentee claimed less than he had a right to
claim.56 Returning briefly to the above disinfectant example, assume the
original disclosure described a functional example in which the
benzalkonium halide was present at 1% by weight, yet the example was
overlooked by the applicant, who agreed to the limited claims reciting the
range of 3% to 5%. The patentee clearly had a right to claim the broader
range of 1% to 5% and, according to the reissue statute, the Patent Office
48. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
49. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.53, -. 60, -. 62 (1997).
50. The Patent Office filing fee for new applications and continuing applications is
currently $790.00 ($395.00 for independent inventors and small business concerns with fewer
than 500 employees). 35 U.S.C. § 41(a), (b) (1994); see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.17-.21 (1997).
51. The filing of a continuing application typically delays the issuance of a patent by
several months.
52. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (Supp. 11995); see also supra text accompanying note 5.
53. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1994) (first paragraph).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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will reissue the patent upon the surrender of the original patent and a proper
application for reissue.
While a reissue application to correct a defective patent in general may
be filed at any time during the life of the patent,58 it is possible to broaden
the claims only if the reissue application is filed within two years of the
original grant of the patent. 9 In addition, the broadened claims may be
subject to the intervening rights of a person who practiced the invention
prior to the reissue.6° For instance, if someone had started to manufacture,
prior to the grant of the reissue, the described disinfectant with a
benzalkonium halide component of, say, 1.5%, then thepatentee would have
no apparent patent rights against that intervening party.
6
E. Infringement
A patent is infringed by anyone who makes, uses, offers for sale, or
sells the patented invention. 62 The statute is simple enough. The patentee
merely carries the burden of proving that the defendant's product or process
is the same as the patented invention.63 The patented invention, as outlined
above, is defined in the claims of the patent and the metes and bounds of the
monopoly granted by the patent are defined in the claims. 64 Accordingly,
infringement is determined by comparing the accused product or process
with the claims. Literal infringement is shown if the accused product or
process incorporates each and every element of the claim.65 However, only a
slight modification in the product may move it outside of the literal scope of
the patent claim,66 while the heart of the invention is clearly copied. This is
where the doctrine of equivalents comes into play: unscrupulous copycats
who design around the letter of the patent claim, but otherwise copy the
57. Id.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 251.
59. Id. (fourth paragraph).
60. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (Supp. 11995).
61. Id. "The court before which such matter is in question may provide for the
continued manufacture... [if] substantial preparation was made before the grant of the
reissue." Id. (second paragraph).
62. Id. § 271(a); see also supra text accompanying note 5.
63. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 685 (Fed.
Cir. 1990) ("he patent owner has always borne the burden of proving infringement ....").
64. See Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1424 (Fed. Cir.
1994).
65. See Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
66. For example, an accused stool could have legs glued to the base, instead of screwed
to the base as expressly required by the claim.
1998]
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invention virtually identically may be stopped by this doctrine.67  The
doctrine affords the courts a vehicle with which to stave off fraud on the
patent and to punish not only literal copying, but also copying by equivalent
design.68
III. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. Two Competing Policy Issues
The patent statutes are founded on the constitutional dictate to promote
the progress of science and the arts69 and on the economically motivated
effort to reward the diligent inventor for his contribution to the arts.70 The
primary policy argument adopted by the proponents of the doctrine of
equivalents is that protection for the patentee must be the primary
consideration in claim scope interpretation. The patentee is to be protected
against copying of his invention where only minor elements of the product
are changed so as to circumvent the letter of the patent claim. As stated
more than 180 years ago by Judge Story: "Mere colorable differences, or
slight improvements, cannot shake the right of the original inventor., 72 The
competing policy argument, adopted by the opponents of the doctrine of
equivalents, is that patents fulfill an even more important function in the
progress of the sciences, namely to provide notice to the public as to what is
and what is not available for general use.73 During the negotiation phase
before the Patent Office, the applicant and the patent examiner agree on the
metes and bounds of the claimed invention, and the printed patent must give
fair notice as to what was contained in the agreement. 74 The law does not
currently favor either proposition. Instead, the doctrine of equivalents
strikes a careful balance between the two competing policies. Nevertheless,
one must not overlook the clear prescription by the courts that the doctrine
of equivalents muft remain the exception rather than the rule.
75
67. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
68. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (A
patent owner "should not be deprived of the benefits of his patent by competitors who
appropriate the essence of an invention while barely avoiding the literal language of the
claims.").
69. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
70. See Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1530 (Newman, J., concurring).
71. Id.
72. Odiome v. Winkley, 18 F. Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814) (No. 10,432).
73. See Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1541 (Plager, J., dissenting).
74. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
75. Id.
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Currently, a heated debate is brewing as to whether the doctrine of
equivalents is an equitable doctrine that evolved out of the equity courts, 7 6 or
a doctrine which is merely equitable in nature and which may be given to a
jury in deciding infringement. 77 A detailed discussion of the issue is beyond
this article and, in fact, the question may reach the Supreme Court before too
long. It is even conceivable that Hilton Davis 11,78 the primary case in this
article, could once more reach the Supreme Court with regard to this issue.
79
B. Graver Tank
Prior to the decision in Hilton Davis II, the courts applied the doctrine
of equivalents and its rule of application as it was announced by the Supreme
Court in Graver Tank Manufacturing Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.80 There,
the Court was concerned with protecting the patent holder against "the
unscrupulous copyist" who would make "insubstantial changes" which add
nothing to the art, yet take the product "outside the reach of law." 81 The
Court further recognized that a copyist's intent on pirating an invention
should be expected to introduce a minor variation in an effort to conceal his
piracy, and that direct and literal "duplication is a dull and very rare type of
infringement., 82 Graver Tank established the so-called function-way-result
test, which asked whether the accused product performed: 1) substantially
the same function; 2) in substantially the same way; and 3) to lead to
substantially the same result.83 As explained in Graver Tank, when two
devices do the same work in substantially the same way, and the result of
76. See, e.g., Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1543 ('The authority to exercise the unique
remedy which is the doctrine of equivalents lies exclusively in courts of equity.") (Plager, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id. at 1525-26 (pointing to the Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the
doctrine of equivalents is properly handled by the jury).
78. Hilton Davis 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1040.
79. Id. at 1053 ("Whether, if the issue were squarely presented to us, we would reach a
different conclusion than did the Federal Circuit is not a question we need to decide today.").
80. 339 U.S. 605 (1950).
81. Id. at 607.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 608. Emphasis is added to indicate that the test is sometimes stated to require
not only substantially the same result but the same result. The arbitrary inclusion or omission
of the additional qualifier, however, does not appear to trigger a different outcome and it may
thus be considered a cosmetic difference. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d
1351, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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both is the same, then the two devices are the same, even though they may be
84different in appearance.
While the rule and its application appeared clear, the various circuits
applied the rule in different ways and reached divergent results. 85 This lack
of uniformity in the application of the doctrine of equivalents was one of the
reasons why Congress, in the interest of promoting uniform patent laws,
established the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982 as the only
federal appeals court to hear patent appeals. 86  Dependable uniformity,
however, eluded the Federal Circuit as well as did questions concerning the
doctrine of equivalents. Nevertheless, two applicable standards soon
crystallized in the newly created court, namely the as-a-whole approach and
the element-by-element analysis.87
The first test compares the accused product with the allegedly infringed
claim as a whole.8 8 The Graver Tank test is applied by asking whether the
accused product performs substantially the same function as the patented
invention, in substantially the same way, to yield substantially the same
result.89 The primary case representing the as-a-whole approach is Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. United States.'° In that case, Hughes held a patent covering
satellite stabilization processes. 91 The Hughes patent, among other claimed
elements, required an interactive feedback system between the satellite and
the ground control station so that satellite velocity and satellite orientation
could be adjusted. The government satellite did not have a feedback
system. Instead, the velocity and orientation control were processed
internally in the satellite.93 Recognizing that the way prong of the function-
way-result test could not easily be satisfied, the Hughes court held that the
84. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 608 (citing Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125
(1877)).
85. Daniel W. McDonald et al., Hilton Davis: The Doctrine of Equivalents Survives -
Now What?, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 309, 311-12 (1997).
86. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, § 127(a), Pub. L. No. 97-164 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1988)). All appeals from final decisions of federal district
courts in patent cases, and from final decisions in the Patent Office, are brought in the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, located in Washington, D.C. See Kalman v. Kimberly-
Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
87. See Paul C. Craane, Comment, At the Boundaries of Law and Equity: The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the Doctrine of Equivalents, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 105,
114-25 (1992).
88. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1364-66.
89. Id. at 1363-64, 1366.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Hughes, 717 F.2d at 1366-64.
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government system was so strikingly similar to the patented system as a
whole that the government system was an equivalent of the patented
invention.
94
That analysis, of course, would have failed in a stringent reading of the
Hughes claim on the government satellite. In fact, the dissent in Hughes
faulted the majority for paying relatively little attention to the specifics of
the claims and for instead viewing the invention as a whole.95 In a
comparison between each element of the claim and the accused device, the
court would have had to find that the Hughes claim was not infringed
because it lacked the required element of satellite to ground control
feedback. The element-by-element analysis, however, had its proponents in
the Federal Circuit as well, and it soon emerged as the more prevalent
standard.96
The element-by-element analysis engendered such mutually exclusive
statements as "when an element is entirely missing [and the accused product]
does not contain either the exact element of the claim or its equivalent, there
is no infringement," 97 and "[t]o require a one-to-one correspondence creates
a bright line rule easier to apply, but costly in terms of unfair results in
exceptional cases."98 It should be noted that the element-by-element analysis
is not only easier to apply than the as-a-whole approach, but it also leads to
more predictable results. The element-by-element analysis can be handled
quantitatively with near mathematical and logical precision, while the as-a-
whole analysis necessarily requires qualitative and thus subjective analysis.
Furthermore, under the element-by-element approach, the scope of
equivalence can be more easily balanced against the limits of prosecution
history, guided by the maxim that "the patent applicant includes elements at
his peril, and that a court is powerless to relieve him of the mistake of
reciting elements which are superfluous to patentability." 99
94. Id. at 1366.
95. Id. at 1366-68 (Davis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
96. See, e.g., Coming Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251,
1259 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("An equivalent must be found for every limitation of the claim
somewhere in an accused device.... "); Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d
931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d
1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Lemelson v. United States, 752 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
97. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949 (Nies, J., additional views).
98. Id. at 946 (Bennet, ., dissenting in part).
99. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Klimsch-Repro, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 586, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
see also Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 83 (D. Mass. 1983), rev'd in
part, aff'd in part, 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983), vacated, 755 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1998]
15
Stemer: The Doctrine of Equivalents after Hilton Davis and Markman, and a
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
IV. LIMITS ON THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
A. Prosecution History Estoppel
The Supreme Court soon recognized during the earliest stages of the
development of the doctrine of equivalents that the acts by the applicant for
obtaining a patent during prosecution before the Patent Office could serve
as a reliable gauge for the scope with which the range of equivalence should
be applied.'0 The rule which soon emerged was that, where an applicant for
patent limits his claims to avoid prior art, the applicant cannot later "argue
for a second bite at the abandoned apple."'0 2  As a first threshold, the
prosecution history10 3 does not come into play if literal infringement is
found.' 4 Where it is available, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel,
also referred to as file wrapper estoppel, refers equally to amendments and to
remarks made by the applicant for patent. 0 5 The threshold question often
asked is whether the patent examiner would have allowed the claims and
issued the patent had the amendment or the remarks not been made or,
alternatively, did the patent examiner allow the application because of the
amendments or the applicant's remarks.
°6
In Lemelson v. General Mills,'07 for instance, the patent examiner
rejected a claim with five elements on prior art, and suggested a more limited
claim with seven elements. 08 Lemelson accepted the seven element claim
and was granted a patent on the claim. 1' 9 During a later infringement action,
Lemelson tried to argue that the examiner's rejection of the five element
claim was in error and that the two additional limitations did not help
distinguish the claims over the prior art. 10 That argument was summarily
rejected and the applicant's acquiescence in a more limited claim was
100. According to the contract model of patents, prosecution before the Patent Office is
considered the contract negotiation phase. See supra Part II.A.
101. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co. v. Davis, 102 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1880); see also
Smith v. Magic City Kennel Club, 282 U.S. 784 (1931).
102. Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
103. The official record of the ex parte proceeding between the applicant for patent and
the Patent Office is referred to as the prosecution history, the file history, or the file wrapper.
The prosecution history of any issued patent may be inspected by the public.
104. Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
105. Townsend Eng'g Co. v. Hitec Co., 829 F.2d 1086, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
106. See Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
107. 968 F.2d at 1202.
108. Id. at 1203.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1207.
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equated to an amendment volunteered by him and a resultant surrender of
claim scope."' The Federal Circuit thereby emphasized the notice function
of the patent, namely that competitors in the pertinent art were entitled to a
determination of the scope of the claims on the record before the Patent
Office.!
1 2
Claim amendments made to persuade the patent examiner to allow the
claims over the prior art generally create an irrebuttable estoppel against the
later broadening of the claims through the doctrine of
equivalents. Additionally, it has been held that statements made by the
applicant even after the examiner had indicated that the claims were
allowable, could be equally damaging when they were directed towards an
interpretation of the claims at issue.'1
On the other hand, not every claim amendment automatically enjoins
the patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents.1 14 Where a claim
was amended during prosecution, the court must determine the reason for the
change.' 15 The scope of prosecution history estoppel is thus determined on
the basis of various factors, including all of the applicant's acts during the
application phase and the reasons for those acts, the prior art removed or not
applied because of those acts, and the patent examiner's objections and
rejections which are removed by those acts.'16
The Federal Circuit in 1993 clarified much of the confusion
surrounding the application of prosecution history estoppel with its decision
in Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade
Commission."7 There, the court held that any unambiguous assertion of
patentability with regard to an element in a claim may create an estoppel
against reliance on the doctrine of equivalents." 8 The applicant in that case
had not amended the claims and added the feature to overcome prior
art.119 Further, the feature was not even necessary to overcome any prior art
111. Id. at 1207-08.
112. Lemelson, 968 F.2d at 1202.
113. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
114. Durango Assoc. Inc. v. Reflange Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
115. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 72 F.3d 857, 864 (Fed.
Cir. 1995), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 1240 (1997), and on remand vacated, 117 F.3d 1385 (Fed.
Cir. 1997).
116. Mannesmann Demag Corp. v. Engineered Metal Prod. Co., 793 F.2d 1279, 1284-
85 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
117. 988 F.2d 1165 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
118. Id. at 1175.
119. Id. at 1173.
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reference cited by the patent examiner.12° Yet, the applicants asserted in
general that the particular feature rendered the claims patentable, and they
were thus held to that assertion.'
2
'
The doctrine of prosecution history estoppel is built on the premise that
a patent is a public document which provides unambiguous notice as to what
is and what is not protected by the claims. 122 The fact that an applicant
makes a more limiting amendment than is necessary in light of the prior art
is of no import.'23 Prosecution history is useful in establishing "meaningful
limitations" on which the public may rely to avoid infringement.
B. The Range of Equivalence Dictated by the Prior Art
In 1990, the Federal Circuit introduced a new test for the doctrine of
equivalents with the construction of the so-called "hypothetical
claim."' 5 Based on the understanding that the doctrine of equivalents is
equivalent to a judicial broadening of the claims of a patent, the court in
Wilson Sporting Goods126 suggested that the proper scope of equivalence
could be determined by expanding the claims of the patent in suit towards
the prior art.27 A hypothetical claim would be tested in light of the prior art
and the deciding question would be whether or not the hypothetical claim
would have and could have been allowed by the patent examiner."2 Upon
the hypothetical allowance of such a broadened claim, the patent owner
would then have the burden of proving that the accused product or process
literally infringes the hypothetical claim. 129
The hypothetical claim construction did not fare well in subsequent
litigation. Three problems with the hypothetical claim become immediately
evident upon a careful review. First, it undermines the function of the Patent
Office as the competent government agency in charge of negotiating the
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1174.
122. Texas Instruments, 988 F.2d at 1175.
123. Wang Labs., Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 868 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also
Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 83 (D. Mass. 1983).
124. Genentech, Inc. v. The Wellcome Found. Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1994)
(citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
125. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
126. Id. at 684.
127. Id.
128. Id. A hypothetical claim is in essence a claim that is broadened relative to the
patent claim and which would literally read on the allegedly infringing product or process. Id.
129. Wilson, 904 F.2d at 685.
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scope of patent claims.1 30 Second, it violates the notice function.131 Third, it
circumvents the statutory prohibition against the addition of new matter.
132
These three factors, of course, go hand in hand. As repeatedly stressed by
the Federal Circuit, competitors in the marketplace must be able to rely on
the scope of the claims in an issued patent.133 The very purpose of the
stringent examination before the Patent Office is to determine the scope of
the claims which are available to the applicant and to issue a patent with
claims which are sufficiently delineated relative to the prior art. The
dependence on the propriety and depth of the examination before the Patent
Office is reflected in the statutory presumption that any issued patent is
valid. 134 Finally, and maybe most importantly, applicants for patent are
statutorily prohibited from adding anything to a claim during prosecution
which was not originally contained in the application. 35 In the hypothetical
claim construction, however, the patentee is in effect allowed to add
limitations not found in the original specification.
For instance, the primary case at hand concerns a dispute involving a
process for purifying red and yellow dyes used in the food and cosmetics
industries. 3  An aqueous solution of the dye is subjected to ultrafiltration
under defined process conditions. The patent claims in question define those
process conditions at a hydrostatic pressure of 200 to 400 p.s.i.g. and at a pH
of 6.0 to 9.0.137 The claimed pH range was added into the independent
claims during prosecution. As agreed by all parties, only the upper limit of
9.0 was necessary in light of the prior art. The lower limit of 6.0 was not
required. However, simply omitting the lower limit would not be acceptable
either because of the requirement that a claim of a patent must be fully
enabled in the specification.13 8 In other words, a lower limit of 4.0 or 3.0, or
even 2.0, may work in the process described in the specification, but the
process would fail at a pH below 2.0. The hypothetical claim construction in
this case, therefore, would have to strike a balance between a maximum
130. See supra Part II.A.
131. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
132. Id. § 132.
133. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (If
broadening of claims under the doctrine of equivalents is always available to the patentee,
then competing market players "will never know whether their actions infringe a granted
patent" and "the public comes to believe (or fear) that the language of patent claims can never
be relied on.").
134. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (Supp. 11995). "A patent shall be presumed valid." Id.
135. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1994).
136. Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1515.
137. Id. at 1515.
138. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
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allowed by the prior art and a minimum dictated by the scope of enablement
in the specification. A hypothetical claim for Hilton Davis would recite a
pH value ranging from 4.0 to 9.0. Hilton Davis, armed with such a claim
would have had little difficulty in showing that Warner-Jenkinson's process,
which operated at a pH of 5.0, infringed their claim.13 9 However, Hilton
Davis now would be awarded a claim which they could not have obtained
from the Patent Office on the basis of their original application. Had they
attempted, during prosecution, to amend their claims to recite a pH ranging
from 4.0 to 9.0, the patent examiner would have required that the new matter
entered with the amendment be canceled because it would have violated
code section 132.'40 The hypothetical claim proposed in Wilson Sporting
Goods, therefore, could potentially violate the statutory prohibition against
the addition of new matter.
C. Hilton Davis I and the Insubstantial Changes Test
After having supported the function-way-result test of Graver Tank for
years as the predominant test for the doctrine of equivalents, the en banc
Federal Circuit held in Hilton Davis I that this test had caused as much
confusion as it had cleared up.141  The court subsequently stated an
apparently new rule which turned on the question of whether the changes
made by the accused copier were substantial or insubstantial.42 The
decision in Hilton Davis I was a narrow one. 143 The majority opinion in the
Federal Circuit decision stressed that the new standard was not a revision of
the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, but a
restatement.' 44 Indeed, the new test had already been expressed in the
139. For clarity of the example, the author has disregarded the other questions
concerning the possible differences between the Wamer-Jenkinson process and the Hilton
Davis claims. In her dissent, Judge Nies pointed out that at least one additional element of the
claim, namely the recited hydrostatic pressure, was not infringed, Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at
1579 (Nies, J., dissenting), and that another element, namely the recited pore size of the
membranes, had not been sufficiently proven to be infringed. Id. at n.34.
140. 35 U.S.C. § 132.
141. Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1518.
142. Id.
143. Seven of the twelve judges formed the majority and Judge Newman filed a
concurring opinion. Five judges dissented, with Judges Plager, Lourie, and Nies each filing a
dissenting opinion. While the majority opinion concentrated largely on Supreme Court
precedent in formulating its opinion, Judge Newman concurred essentially only in the
outcome, as her opinion was primarily based on an economic incentives analysis. Id. at 1512.
144. Id. at 1516.
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seminal Graver Tank decision. 145 There, the Court warned against an overly
narrow and literal reading of the patent claims which would allow an
"unscrupulous copyist to make unimportant and insubstantial changes and
substitutions in the patent" without being liable for infringement." The
majority in Hilton Davis I further held that infringement, under the doctrine
of equivalents, was a question of fact and thus, a question for the jury.147 In
fact, much of the discussion in the various opinions, and particularly Judge
Plager's dissent, deals with the judge-jury question and it was widely
expected that the Supreme Court would decide that issue on appeal. 148 That
expectancy was heightened since the Court had during the previous term
affirmed the Federal Circuit in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,149
which held that claim construction in patent infringement was exclusively
within the province of the court and should not be presented to the jury.1 50
Finally, the Federal Circuit held that the question whether or not the doctrine
of equivalents was to be applied is not at the discretion of the trial judge.151
The decision in Hilton Davis I turned on the question of whether or not
a pH of 5.0, as practiced by Wamer-Jenkinson, was equivalent to and
included in the range of 6.0 to 9.0.152 Each element of the Hilton Davis
claim was analyzed and compared with the Wamer-Jenkinsonprocess.153 Hilton Davis was held to have carried its burden of showing the
presence of each element in the accused process with all but one claim
element finding literal support.154 The element defining the pH155 in the
process was found to be present, albeit outside of the claimed
145. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
146. Id. at 607.
147. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1520.
148. Both of the principal parties' briefs and each of the 17 briefs for amicus curiae
filed in the Supreme Court, discussed the judge-jury question at length and much of the oral
hearing before the Court dealt with the question. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
149. 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
150. Id. at 1396.
151. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1521.
152. Id. at 1524.
153. Id. at 1524-25.
154. Id.
155. The pH scale expresses the acidity, neutrality, or basicity of dilute aqueous
solutions. The scale varies within the numerical range of-l.0 to 15.0. A pH of 7.0 designates
a neutral composition. The lower the number, the higher the acidity of the solution. The scale
is a logarithmic scale with a base of 10. A numerical change in the pH by one designates a 10-
fold increase or decrease of acidity and, similarly, a change by two designates a 100-fold
increase or decrease. KENNETH W. WHrITEN ET AL., GENERAL CHEMISTRY WITH QUALITATIVE
ANALYSIS 531-34 (1988).
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range.156 Hilton Davis had amended its claims during prosecution before the
patent examiner by adding the numeric pH limits. The upper limit of 9.0
was necessary in delineating the claims against the prior art. 157 The lower
limit of 6.0 was not necessary in light of the prior art. As noted above, it is
questionable, however, whether the Patent Office would or could have
allowed an open-ended limitation which recited only the upper limit of 9.0,
but not a lower limit. Such a claim would run afoul of the distinct claiming
requirement 5 8 and of the enablement requirement. 15 9 Adding an express
limit other than 6.0, on the other hand, would run afoul of the prohibition
against the addition of new matter. 16° Hilton Davis, therefore, in order to
obtain a proper claim with an acceptable range of pH values, would have had
to file a continuing application, with the attendant costs and the delay in the
prosecution. 161  Alternatively, Hilton Davis could have attempted to
surrender their patent and obtain a broadened reissue claim within two years
of the patent. Unfortunately for Hilton Davis, Warner-Jenkinson would then
likely have been able to rely on intervening rights. 62 But then again, none of
this mattered to the en banc Federal Circuit, because a pH of 5.0 was
equivalent to a pH of 6.0 and the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel did
not apply where no compelling reason was evident to the court for Hilton
Davis to enter the lower limit of 6.0.163
V. HILTON DAVIS H
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Federal Circuit's majority
opinion. 64 The Court held that prosecution history could indeed create an
156. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1516.
157. Id. at 1515-16. The patent examiner had cited a prior art reference which
disclosed a similar process operating at a pH between 11 and 13. Id.
158. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994) (second paragraph).
159. Id. (first paragraph).
160. Id. § 132. In her dissent in Hilton Davis I, the late Judge Nies argued that the
notice function of the claims would be served yet the claims were not unduly enlarged if the
courts carefully applied the doctrine of equivalents to individual elements of the claims and
substituted only equivalent elements. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1573-74 (Nies, J.,
dissenting).
161. See supra Part II.C.
162. The Hilton Davis patent, No. 4,560,746, issued in 1985. By the time Warner-
Jenkinson learned of the existence of the '746 patent in October 1986, they had begun to
commercially use the infringing process. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1516. Hilton Davis
learned of Warner-Jenkinson's infringement in 1989 when it was no longer possible to
broaden the patent claims in a reissue. Id.
163. Id. at 1528.
164. Hilton Davis l1, 117 S. Ct. at 1040.
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estoppel and while affirming the majority of the Federal Circuit in virtually
all other aspects, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further
proceedings. Specifically, the Court held that any claim amendment
during prosecution, absent an explanation to the contrary on the public
record, created a rebuttable presumption that the amendment was necessary
for patentability.' 66 This presumption, the Court argued, would strike a
proper balance between the notice function of the claims and the primacy of
the Patent Office in ensuring that patent claims do not cover more than the
invention which is disclosed in the application. 16
7
A. The Supreme Court Decision in Detail
The question certified to the Supreme Court in Hilton Davis II
was: "Whether patent infringement exists whenever the accused product or
process is 'equivalent' to the invention claimed in the patent, in that the
differences are not 'substantial' as determined by a jury, even though the
accused product or process is outside the literal scope of the patent claim."' 68
Wamer-Jenkinson's main arguments were that the doctrine of equivalents, as
defined in Graver Tank in 1950 cannot be reconciled with the 1952 Patent
Act, 69 that equivalents should be limited to those explicitly mentioned in the
patent,170 and that Congress did not allow for infringement by equivalents in
the 1952 Patent Act.171 Hilton Davis, of course, was quite satisfied with the
majority opinion in the Federal Circuit and argued that the doctrine of
equivalents had survived the 1952 Patent Act,"72 the doctrine should be
broadly applied and remain available in all infringement actions, 17 and that
equivalents questions are properly presented to the jury in a jury trial.174
1. The Doctrine of Equivalents and the 1952 Patent Act
Justice Thomas, writing for the unanimous Court, explained that the
differences between the earlier patent statute and the 1952 Patent Act were
165. Id. at 1054.
166. Id. at 1051.
167. Id.
168. Brief for Petitioner at i, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728).
169. Id. at 13.
170. Id. at31.
171. ld. at41.
172. Brief for Respondent at 11, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728).
173. Id. at 23.
174. Id. at 36.
1998]
23
Stemer: The Doctrine of Equivalents after Hilton Davis and Markman, and a
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
minimal with regard to the requirement for definite and distinct claiming. 175
The results reached in Graver Tank, Justice Thomas argued, would not have
been different had the case been decided following the 1952 Patent Act.
176
In addition, the arguments upon which Warner-Jenkinson's contention was
based had already been presented in Graver Tank, but had failed to garner a
majority. 177 Accordingly, overruling Graver Tank on that basis was not
warranted.
178
Next, the Court discussed Wamer-Jenkinson's contention that no
express mention of Graver Tank or its standard could be found in the
legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act and that Congress had statutorily
overruled Graver Tank.179 Wamer-Jenkinson had argued in their brief that it
was improper to attribute a silent incorporation of the Graver Tank rule to
Congress.18° On questioning by the bench at oral argument, Warner-
Jenkinson's counsel softened that argument and instead relied on his fallback
position that the precedent need not be overruled in its entirety, but could
serve a useful function if the precedential rule of Graver Tank was properly
read.181 The Court was not convinced that Congress' silence concerning
Graver Tank and the doctrine of equivalents spoke to a statutory overruling
of the precedent. Instead, the Court opined that Congress had in fact not
overruled the Graver Tank precedent182 and that "Congress [could] legislate
the doctrine of equivalents out of existence any time it chooses."' 8  The
policy arguments presented by both parties in Hilton Davis II, Justice
Thomas suggested, should be addressed to Congress instead of to the
Supreme Court. 1
84
2. Element by Element Analysis
With regard to the elemental approach to the doctrine of equivalents,
the Court sided with the concerns mentioned in the dissents at the Federal
175. Hilton Davis 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1047.
176. Id.
177. Id. at n.3.
178. Id. at 1047-48.
179. Id. at 1047.
180. Brief for Petitioner at 42-45, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728).
181. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at *18, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-
728), 1996 WL 593639 (Oct. 15, 1996) (oral argument of Richard G. Taranto, Esq., on behalf
of Wamer-Jenkinson) (no departure of Graver Tank needs to take place "depending on how
broadly one reads it") [hereinafter Transcript].
182. Hilton Davis 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 1048.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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Circuit level that patent claims had become too unpredictable because of the
automatic and divergent apxlication of the doctrine and that the doctrine had
taken on a life of its own. 5 The Court thereby adopted much of the logic
presented in the dissent by the late Judge Nies1'6 and held that the doctrine
could best serve its proper function if it was applied on an element-by-
element basis.187 Each element of a patent claim is material and essential,
the Court held, and the doctrine of equivalents must not be applied to the
claimed invention as a whole, but to each element. 88 Also, the doctrine
must not be so broadly applied as to effectively remove a required
element.189 The Court cited with approval the broad proposition that the
doctrine must be applied so as to carefully distinguish between substituting
an equivalent component within an invention and enlarging an invention
beyond what is claimed. 19° The applicant, after all, negotiates the scope of
protection to which the patentee is entitled with the Patent Office. That
scope of protection cannot be enlarged at a later point so as to include a
competitor within the claims. Only if the competitor copies the invention,
i.e., practices a fraud on the patent,' 9' and replaces within the invention a
component with one which is equivalent yet does not literally read on the
claimed element, should the doctrine of equivalents be applied. 92 The
doctrine is equitable in nature and it is to be applied so as not to "place the
inventor at the mercy of verbalism and... subordinat[e] substance to
form."'
193
3. Prosecution History Estoppel
Next, the Court discussed the position of the doctrine of prosecution
history estoppel in the context of the elemental approach and the new
rebuttable presumption rule. Warner-Jenkinson had argued that any
surrender by the patentee during prosecution before the Patent Office was
essentially equivalent to a public notice of surrender 94 and that any
185. Id. at 1048-49.
186. Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1573-74 (Nies, J., dissenting).
187. Hilton Davis I, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) ('The
essence of the doctrine is that one may not practice a fraud on a patent.").
192. Id. at 608-09.
193. Id. at 607.
194. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728) ("[T]he public is
entitled to rely on a reading of those disclosures [made in the patent application], and not
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limitation entered during patent prosecution should estop the patentee from
later asserting broader coverage. 95 That argument, according to the Court,
went too far.196 The Court held that the reasons for such an amendment
should have a bearing on proper claim interpretation. 197 First, the Court
relied on its own precedent which included a line of cases in which the Court
had considered the respective reasons why a certain amendment was
required by the Patent Office. 198 Second, the Court referred to the amicus
brief of the United States, which listed several additional reasons upon
which the Patent Office may require an amendment to a claim. 99 The
United States' amicus brief made reference to the testimony by one of the
Hilton Davis' inventors according to whom the process could work with
much lower pH values than those claimed, but that a pH below 6.0 would
"cause 'tremendous foaming problems in the plant."'" Accordingly, the
United States argued that the pH limit of 6.0 was added not to overcome
prior art, but to limit the claims to what was enabled in the application, and
therefore, the doctrine of prosecution history did not apply.20' That
conclusion, however, mischaracterizes the interplay between the enablement
requirement in the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the distinct
claiming requirement in the second paragraph. 2 Only what is enabled in
the specification is the applicant's invention and the claims are limited to
that invention.0 3 To be sure, it may be true that the "purpose of the
enablement requirement is not to limit the scope of the patent right" per
se,2 4 but it is nevertheless the necessary result if the term invention is
uniformly applied throughout the text of the statute.
undertake independent scientific experiments, to understand clearly the scope of the
monopoly .... ).
195. Hilton Davis 11, 117 S. Ct. at 1049.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136 (1942)
(distinguishing a limitation in an original application claim from one which was added during
prosecution); Keystone Driller Co. v. Northwest Eng'g Corp., 294 U.S. 42, 42 (1935) (claims
limited during prosecution could not be enlarged in infringement action because the enlarged
claims would have been within the prior art which prompted the claim amendment).
199. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1050.
200. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728)
(quoting Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1542 (Plager, J., dissenting)).
201. Id.
202. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994).
203. Id.
204. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728)
(citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994)).
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In the case at hand, the enabled invention was to be practiced at a pH of
6.0 to 9.0 and the Hilton Davis inventors could not teach an ordinarily
skilled artisan how to make and use the invention outside that range.20 5 They
were, in fact, faced with "tremendous foaming problems" below a pH of 6.0
and thus they could not teach the invention outside that range. The patent
grant, however, is an exchange in which the inventor teaches the invention
and everything outside the boundaries of that invention, belongs to the
public or to a later inventor.
On questioning by the Court, counsel for Hilton Davis pursued a line of
argument similar to that of the United States. Hilton Davis argued that
"what the claim [sic] has to do is, it has to enable a person of ordinary skills
in the art to practice the invention"2°6 and that the examiner suggested the
lower pH limitation be added to the claim so as to assure the enablement
requirement was satisfied.2 7 Again, the mischaracterization of the patent
statutes is evident. Both the first and second paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. § 112
deal with one and the same invention. ° The first paragraph requires that the
invention be described so that those skilled in the pertinent field could
practice it, and the second paragraph requires that the same invention be
defined and distinctly claimed."
Notwithstanding the questionable line of argument, the Court reached
the correct conclusion with regard to prosecution historyr estoppel by
emphasizing the expert agency status of the Patent Office.z'o The Court
"should be extremely reluctant to upset the basic assumptions" made by the
Patent Office unless it had "substantial reasons to do so. '211 With special
reference to the case at bar, the Court announced the rule that the burden
rests on the patentee to show that the reason for the amendment during
patent prosecution should not render the amendment available as a
prosecution history estoppel.21 2 The Court held that the record did not
contain clear enough evidence which would enable Hilton Davis to carry
their burden to overcome the presumption of an estoppel.2 3 The case was
thus remanded with an invitation that the Federal Circuit study the record
205. Id.
206. Transcript, supra note 181, at *36 (oral argument of David E. Schmit, Esq., on
behalf of Hilton Davis).
207. Id.
208. 35 U.S.C. § 112.
209. Id.
210. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1051.
211. Id. at 1050.
212. Id. at 1051.
213. Id.
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and decide whether or not Hilton Davis should be given an opportunity to
proffer additional evidence.214
4. No Equitable Threshold to Trigger Doctrine of Equivalents
Based on the premise that the Graver Tank rule was developed in
response to problems with the "unscrupulous copyist" and "pirate, 2 5
Warner-Jenkinson argued that proof of intent was a necessary threshold
before the doctrine of equivalents could be triggered.21 6 That argument
appeared to be further supported in the Federal Circuit majority opinion
which hinted to evidence of copying as being an important factor in the
application of the doctrine.1 7 The majority nevertheless acknowledged that
intent is not an element of infringement. In his dissent, however, Judge
Plager vehemently argued that the doctrine of equivalents belonged entirely
to the equity courts, 2 9 and was thus available only after a corresponding
equitable threshold had been overcome. 220 The Supreme Court sided with
the Federal Circuit majority, yet cast a doubtful eye on the applicability of
standards such as independent development and intentional designing around
221a patent. It would be difficult, the Court stated, to distinguish between
those who intentionally copied the invention with minor changes and those
who tried to design around the claims of the patent, thus appropriating for
themselves as much of the patented invention as they could.2
214. Id.
215. Brief for Petitioner at 32, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728) (citing Graver Tank &
Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950)).
216. See generally id. at 32-41.
217. Hilton Davis !, 62 F.3d at 1519.
218. Id.; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (the
monopoly grant is effective regardless of whether the infringer knows of the patent).
219. Hilton Davis I, 62 F.3d at 1543 (Plager, J., dissenting) ("By virtue of its unique
place in our legal system, and by long-standing custom and tradition, equity powers are
exercisable only by judges. The authority to exercise the unique remedy which is the doctrine
of equivalents lies exclusively in courts of equity.").
220. Id.
221. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1052.
222. Id.
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5. Not Limited to Equivalents Disclosed in Specification
Next, the Court tackled Wamer-Jenkinson's argument that the notice
function of the claims would be best served if equivalents were limited to
those disclosed in the patent.223 The dissenters in the Federal Circuit had
argued a similar proposition, namely that equivalence should be determined
with a view to what is considered equivalent at the time the patent
issues.2 24 In oral argument, the Court presented Hilton Davis' counsel with a
pertinent hypothetical: a chemical composition with five ingredients, A, B,
C, D, and E, for growing hair.225 After fifteen years, new chemicals are
developed which replace each of the ingredients until none of the original
ingredients remain. On questioning whether the composition with the new
ingredients were equivalent, Hilton Davis answered in the affirmative, which
prompted the Court to respond:
I think the lawyers on the other side are arguing, my goodness,
we're supposed to advise clients, and we have no idea how to do it,
because we read the patent thing and we know with this doctrine
people might discover all kinds of new chemicals in the future, and
we just don't know how to do it, and so what we're groping for, is
there then no limitation on this doctrine of equivalents?
2 7
Even in the light of these apparently substantial reservations, the Court
summarily rejected the argument that equivalence turned on what was
known at the time the patent issued and held that the proper time for
equivalence analysis was at the time of infringement.22
B. No Ruling in the Judge-Jury Question
The Court declined to rule on the question of whether the doctrine of
equivalents was for the jury or for the judge. The issue need not be resolved,
the Court stated, to answer the question presented in the case, and declined
to rule on it.229 However, the Court hinted that it was in likely agreement
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Transcript, supra note 181, at 39 (oral argument of David E. Schmit, Esq.).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 40.
228. Hilton Davis I, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
229. Il
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with the Federal Circuit and that the Court's recent Markman 30 ruling did
not suggest a different outcome.
231
C. Markman v. Westview
In one of the most anticipated decisions of patent law in recent years,
the Supreme Court, in 1996, affirmed a Federal Circuit en banc decision in
Markman.22 There, a jury had found a patent for a dry cleaning inventory
system infringed and thus found for the patentee.233  The trial judge,
however, based on his interpretation of the term "inventory" in the patent
claims in question, entered judgment against the patentee, notwithstanding
the jury verdict to the contrary. 3 4 The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc,
affirmed the trial judge and held that he had correctly taken the claim
interpretation from the jury.
The unanimous Supreme Court also agreed and held that patent claim
construction was "exclusively within the province of the court."236  The
decision affirmed three basic tenets of patent law, namely that patent
infringement was subject to the right of jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment;23 7 that the historical test of the right to jury trial did not compel
a conclusion that terms of art and the claims were interpreted by the jury; 2 8
and that precedent, judicial efficiency, reviewability issues, and policy
considerations compelled a finding that claim interpretation was exclusively
for the judge.239 Citing to potential uncertainty in reviewing jury verdicts
and, particularly, to the virtual impossibility of establishing issue preclusion
even within a given jurisdiction, the Court concluded that "treating
interpretive issues as purely legal will promote (though it will not guarantee)
intrajurisdictional certainty through the application of stare decisis on those
questions not yet subject to interjurisdictional uniformity under the authority
of the single appeals court.
'240
230. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
231. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
232. Markman, 52 F.3d at 967.
233. Id. at 973.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 979.
236. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
237. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law.., the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved .... ).
238. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1393.
239. Id. at 1396.
240. Id.
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1. The Markman Hearing
The decision in Markman soon spawned the creation of the so-called
Markman hearing, a pretrial bench hearing during which the questions of
claim interpretation are settled.241 Following the Markman hearing, the trial
judge decides on the proper scope and interpretation of the patent claims
and, if the trial is to a jury, instructs the jury accordingly. The jury then, in
the second phase of an infringement trial under the Markman doctrine,
decides whether or not the accused product or process indeed infringes the
claims as interpreted by the trial judge.242
The decision in Markman was not specific with regard to the issues to
be resolved in the Markman hearing and with regard to the type of evidence
to be admitted into the hearing.243 The Federal Circuit has recently shed
some light on these issues.2 4 For instance, the court held in Vitronics 5 that
intrinsic evidence such as the patent claims, the specification, and the file
history were dominant over extrinsic evidence such as prior art documents,
dictionaries, and expert testimony.246 Extrinsic evidence should be allowed
into the hearing only if ambiguities remain after considering all of the
intrinsic evidence.
247
2. Reconciling Hilton Davis II with Markman
Markman was primarily concerned with ensuring predictability and
reviewability in infringement actions and thus took all of the claim
interpretation from the jury.248 Hilton Davis II, on the other hand, appears to
have affirmed the jury's role in claim interpretation where literal
infringement could not be shown.249 Referring to the seminal Supreme Court
decision in Winans v. Denmead,2 °0 which hinted at the proposition that
241. See Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996); General
Am. Transp. Corp. v. Cryo-Trans, Inc., 93 F.3d 766 (Fed. Cir. 1996), cert. denied., 117 S. Ct.
1334 (1997); Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. United States Surgical Corp., 93 F.3d 1572 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
242. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1581-82 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
243. Marknan, 52 F.3d at 967.
244. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1576.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1583.
247. Id.
248. See Marknan, 52 F.3d at 967.
249. See Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
250. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
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equivalence was a question for the jury,251 the Court in Hilton Davis II
opined that Markman did not appear to necessitate a different result.25 2 With
regard to the reviewability issue, the Court suggested that procedural
vehicles such as partial or complete summary judgment, judgment as a
matter of law, special verdict forms, interrogatories on each claim element,
and post verdict judgments as a matter of law should be considered by the
Federal Circuit.y
In a realistic context, there is a curious interplay between the Markman
hearing and the proposition that the doctrine of equivalents lies within the
province of the jury. Assume, for instance, that the trial court decides on
close of a Markman hearing for a certain construction of the patent claims
and that the claims so interpreted were not literally infringed. The entire
case would now be tried to the jury, including the question of equivalence
and the interpretation of the specific claim element for which no literal
infringement could be found. However, claim interpretation necessarily
requires a review of the combination of elements and the interaction among
the individual elements. The issue of claim interpretation as a whole is thus
back in the jury's hands and the importance of the Markman hearing is
effectively reduced to having a minor impact on the outcome of the
infringement action. In the alternative situation, of course, where the
Markman hearing results in an interpretation of the claims which literally
encompasses the accused product or process, the jury's role is substantially
reduced and infringement can often be found immediately as a matter of law.
It is also quite telling that the jury instructions in Hilton Davis I
included several issues which, according to Markman, would not be given to
the jury in literal infringement 2 4 The trial judge instructed the jury to
interpret the claims as one with ordinary skill in the pertinent art would read
the claims.25 He further instructed the jury to consider intrinsic evidence
such as the patent specification, other claims of the patent, the prosecution
history, extrinsic evidence such as expert testimony, "the circumstances
surrounding the inception of the patent application," technical literature, and
the prior art256 Allowing the jury to consider extrinsic evidence to such a
degree-and indeed the fact finding function of the jury can only be met by
allowing the jury to look to extrinsic evidence-suggests that the concern
251. Id. at 344.
252. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1053.
253. Id. at n.8.
254. See generally Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1520-21, 1538; Marknan, 52 F.3d at
970-71.
255. Hilton Davis !, 62 F.3d at 1556 (Nies, J., dissenting).
256. Id.
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with a lack of reviewability due to black-box jury verdicts257 has fallen
victim to the broader proposition that the doctrine of equivalents must be
given to the jury. s
D. The Re-'and
On remand, the Federal Circuit held that Hilton Davis, in light of the
new rebuttable presumption rule, should be given an opportunity to proffer
evidence in their favor. 9 The prosecution history of the Hilton Davis patent
was silent with regard to the reasons for the amendment. Accordingly,
Hilton Davis was faced with the presumption that the pH was limited from
6.0 to 9.0 for patentability reasons. The court held that even if the patentee
can show that the amendment was not related to patentability, the court must
still settle the issue of whether that reason is sufficient to overcome
prosecution history estoppel.26 Finally, the court specifically cautioned the
district court to carefully balance between the interests of public notice and
the dependability of prosecution history on the one hand, and the preliminary
purpose of the doctrine of equivalents of assuring fairness to the patentee
and of preventing fraud on the patent, on the other hand.261
E. The Argument Warner-Jenkinson Failed to Make
The primary case at hand is quite simple. Yet, Wamer-Jenkinson failed
to make the very argument which won their case. Hilton Davis obtained a
patent with claims calling for clear and unambiguous numerical
boundaries. As noted above,262 the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel
is not a recent creation by any stretch of the imagination. Hilton Davis made
a mistake.263 Warner-Jenkinson, on the other hand, acted prudently and
257. Hilton Davis 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.
258. Id. at 1054 n.8.
259. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 114 F.3d 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (per curiam), enforcing Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. 1040 (1997) [hereinafter Hilton
Davis III].
260. Id. at 1163.
261. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 117 S. Ct. 1040,
1051 (1997)).
262. See supra Part IV.A.
263. Transcript, supra note 181, at 31. On questioning by the Court, counsel for Hilton
Davis quipped: "[H]ad I written the claim today knowing what I know, it would have been
written differently." Id.
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compared their process with the Hilton Davis patent.264 Relying on the
notice content of the Hilton Davis patent, Wamer-Jenkinson's patent counsel
advised that apH of 5.0 in his client's process was not equivalent to a pH of
6.0 or more.z65  Nothing in the file wrapper of the patent indicated
otherwise. 266  Yet, the Federal Circuit would have punished Warner-
Jenkinson without faulting Hilton Davis for their mistake.
The doctrine of equivalents is an equitable doctrine and it has been
devised to protect the patentee against unscrupulous copycats. 267 Here, the
accused infringer did not act on inequitable principles and should therefore
not be punished. Short of abolishing the doctrine of equivalents, the
Supreme Court found the proper demarcation268 which will probably absolve
Warner-Jenkinson from a holding of infringement. Whether or not the new
rebuttable presumption rule is a good rule, remains to be seen. As
acknowledged by the Federal Circuit, prosecution before the Patent Office
will be quickly adapted to the new rule in that applicants and the Patent
Office will add express statements with reasons for amendments or
269remarks. It appears, however, that such statements may not render the
scope of equivalents easier to apply. The Patent Office, naturally, will tend
to add statements which would support estoppel, while the applicant will try
to add statements to the contrary. Questions of this nature are often dealt
with just prior to the allowance of the application at a time when both the
patent examiner and applicant's counsel are satisfied to have concluded the
adverse examination phase and to have come to a mutually satisfactory
agreement. Naturally, neither will at that point risk aggravating the situation
and endangering the allowance.
264. Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, Hilton Davis II (No. 95-728). Upon learning of Hilton
Davis' patent in late 1986, Wamer-Jenkinson immediately had their patent counsel prepare an
infringement opinion. Id. Counsel came to the conclusion that the patent was invalid and the
claims were not infringed primarily because of the fact that Hilton Davis had added the pH
range of 6.0 to 9.0 by amendment. Id. at 6.
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id.
267. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
268. See Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1040.
269. Hilton Davis III, 114 F.3d at 1163.
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VI. A PROPOSAL
One may safely assume that the doctrine of equivalents will remain
applicable into the foreseeable future, whether under judicial precedent or
under statutory codification.27 0  The Supreme Court decision, while
appropriately strengthening the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel as a
balancing tool against the doctrine of equivalents, has not provided any
guidance with regard to the division within the Federal Circuit. To the
contrary, the Court essentially offered the Federal Circuit carte blanche for
further clarification of the doctrine.271 The difference between the function-
way-result test and the insubstantial changes test does not appear to be
significant beyond specific fact-driven application to a particular claimed
element. Based on this premise, the courts will now have to define the
interplay between the jury-exclusive Markman hearing and the jury-inclusive
claim construction under the doctrine of equivalents. Besides the Supreme
Court's suggestion towards more particularized jury verdict forms and
.27
special interrogatories,2 it would appear that a more gradual approach to
infringement could further aid in devising a more equitable doctrine which
exhibits concern for both parties' positions. Such a gradual approach could
define various levels of equivalence, ranging from virtual identity to
substantially outside the range of equivalence.
By way of example, assume that following a Markman hearing the court
comes to the conclusion that one element of the claim in question is not
literally infringed. Thereupon, the patentee shifts his allegation to
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. At this point, the court
conducts a further hearing during which equivalence is defined in various
degrees. In Hilton Davis, for instance, the court could have held that a pH of
5.8 was squarely equivalent to the claimed lower limit of 6.0 and the court
270. The former situation appears to be more likely than the latter. Judge Newman
wrote:
The doctrine of equivalents has neither greatly excited the centers of legal
scholarship, nor seriously stirred action-oriented industry. Indeed, there
remains a telling silence on the part of the technology community, for or
against. Despite the controversial changes proposed in opinions of this court,
there has been little objective policy exploration, economic analysis,
legislative proposal, or even a search for consensus. There has, of course,
been a good deal of speculation flowing from the inconsistency of our
decisions.
Hilton Davis 1, 62 F.3d at 1529 (Newman, J., concurring).
271. Hilton Davis II, 117 S. Ct. at 1054. "[W]e see no purpose in going further and
micro-managing the Federal Circuit's particular word-choice for analyzing equivalence." Id.
272. Id. at 1053 at n.8.
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could have thus assigned 100% equivalence to that expanded range; a lower
pH of 5.5 could be assigned 80% equivalence, a pH of 5.2 could be assigned
60% equivalence, etc. The jury, however, will not learn of these discrete
levels, but will determine the facts as to which pH level is prevalent in the
infringing process. The jury is then regularly charged following the trial,
with the various fact questions, including the graduated scale of equivalence.
The foregoing graduated equivalence model appears to be applicable in
the mechanical, chemical, and electrical arts. Whether or not the model may
be properly utilized in the pharmaceutical and biochemistry arts cannot be
easily answered. However, it is evident that the graduated equivalence
model will not apply where the question regards two discrete elements not
subject to a gradual differentiation. By way of example, one chemical may
be substituted for a claimed chemical in a composition; or in a mechanical
device, a two-part hinge of the claim may be replaced with a weakened
material structure, which allows bending similarly to a hinge, or a screw
connection may be replaced with a glue connection. Similarly to an
independent examination or a reexamination, 3 the accused product or
process may thereby be subjected to an independent review, whether by jury,
judge, Patent Office, or an independent, specifically established panel. That
review must be made without considering the prior art. Instead, only the
claimed invention is compared with the accused product or process. If it is
found in that review that the added feature 274 renders the claim describing
the accused product or process patentable over the patented invention, then
the accused party will be presumed to have carried its burden of proving non
equivalence. In other words, did the accused infringer substitute his own
invention which would, had he filed an application, have resulted in the
issuance of his own patent? The independent review could thereby utilize
the same examination guidelines as used by patent examiners in obviousness
questions with only slight modifications.275 The determination of the prior
273. Any patent may be reexamined upon the request of the patent owner or a third
party and the patentability of the claims may thereby be reviewed in light of additional prior
art. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1994).
274. The element or elements which are the subject of the equivalence determination.
275. The practice with respect to determining whether an invention, as claimed, is
obvious, generally follows the decision in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966),
wherein the Court stated:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined;
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained;
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this
background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is
determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to
[Vol. 22:783
36
Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/9
Sterner
art, as required in the first prong of the Graham v. John Deere276 test would
be limited to determining the content and disclosure of the patent. The
second prong, namely the determination of the difference between the claims
and the accused device,277 goes to the heart of the equivalence determination.
The third prong, namely the determination of the level of skill in the aft8
satisfies the requirement that equivalence be determined at the time of
infringement.27 9 If the review is given to the jury, each of the three prongs
may be separately listed on a jury verdict form, thus facilitating specific and
itemized appellate review of the verdict.2
0
The independent examination review model and the graduated
equivalence model may be applied separately and independently of each
other, depending on the facts of a specific case. The two models may also be
used in conjunction with one another, with the independent examination
review model defining the outer boundaries of the range of equivalence and
the graduated equivalence model defining discrete levels within that range.
VII. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of equivalents is here to stay. The Federal Circuit will
probably adhere to the insubstantial changes test for the doctrine within the
near future. Whether or not district court decisions that retain the function-
way-result test will be reversed on this ground remains to be seen. The
doctrine of prosecution history estoppel has been slightly fortified with the
new rebuttable presumption rule. However, its impact will fade within the
next few years as the Patent Office and applicants will ensure that explicit
statements concerning the reasons for a claim amendment become part of the
prosecution history.
As the interplay between the jury-exclusive Markman hearing and the
jury-inclusive fact-finding issues surrounding the doctrine of equivalents is
further defined in the courts, the doctrine of equivalents and the doctrine of
prosecution history estoppel will continue to inject a certain amount of
ambiguity and uncertainty into patent protection and patent
infringement. Nevertheless, the additional protection afforded diligent
inventors who contribute to the arts and further science against unscrupulous
the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be
patented.
Id. at 17-18.
276. Id. at 17.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See supra Part V.A.5.
280. See Hilton Davis 1I, 117 S. Ct. at 1053 n.8.
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copycats and against fraud on the patent may be well worth the price for that
uncertainty. The graduated equivalence model and the independent
examination review model proposed above may further aid the equitable
principles involved in patent protection and patent infringement without
offending the notice function of the patent system.
Werner Sterner
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